Over the last ten to fifteen years, and in response to the huge growth in demand for unsecured consumer credit, UK banks have reviewed, automated, de-skilled and streamlined traditional credit assessment techniques. In pursuit of margin and market share, today's due diligence relies increasingly on centralised data and statistical "certainty".
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EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY

ARRANGEMENTS
Introduction
The relationship between a banker and a customer has its foundations in wellestablished UK case law 1 , reinforced, since 1992, by a code of conduct. Until 1997, however, the code was silent on the matter of dealing with non-performing loans. In 1997 banks made a firm commitment to "consider cases of financial difficulty sympathetically and positively".
Banks also pledged themselves to
" help you (sic) to overcome your difficulties".
2
The banks' commitment covers the period before formal insolvency action and also echoes a much-ignored plea from lenders for customers to give early warning of debt problems. Amongst the motivations for making this plea is that problems can be averted and a customer retained. Coincidentally, early warning of problems allows lenders to act to their own best advantage by taking individual action for debt recovery before the competing claims of other lenders level the "playing field" with the collective nature of the bankruptcy procedure.
The code is silent, however, on the banks' treatment of customers following notice of formal insolvency. At these times there is growing evidence that banks act purely in their own short-term interests 3 .
This paper focuses on the law and practice surrounding personal and unincorporated business debt, although parallels in the corporate world are evident. The paper looks closely at the banker -customer relationship at a crucial time of crisis (customer insolvency) and surveys the various influences placed on bankers including the increasing demand for consumer credit and society's changing attitude to bankruptcy.
The paper also looks at the statutory choices faced by insolvent debtors and their creditors and goes on to review the general economic factors that have coloured creditor behaviour during the last decade. It touches on the operational handling of insolvency situations, the creditors' policies towards problem debt and the ethical considerations that guide them.
The paper concludes by arguing that in a highly competitive environment, where debt is a direct corollary to credit granting, banks can do much to regain the trust and security that lead to profitable lifetime relationships with customers.
The banker -customer relationship
UK retail banks operate in an extremely competitive environment and invest heavily in gaining competitive advantage. Traditional banks suffer pressure on profit margins and growing threats from non-traditional competitors such as supermarkets and even football clubs 4 . Competitive pressures and available technology have, in part, resulted in an orientation away from the relational banking of the "old fashioned" high street bank manager, towards the standardisation and transactional banking of the direct seller. Technical competence in lending is largely subordinated to systematic "credit scoring" and centralisation based on empirical information from a variety of sources 5 .
Whilst streamlined systems for lending can reduce costs and increase profitability in the short-term it does serve to reinforce the moral hazard problems associated with dealing with borrowers at "arms length".
The legal relationship between bankers and their customers was investigated by the National Consumer Council in 1983 6 and reviewed by the Jack Committee, which reported in 1989 7 . Jack found that the legal relationship was robust and did not require urgent amendment 8 . Both the NCC and Jack, however, were silent on the specific problem of non-performing loans and bad debts.
With a widely publicised code of conduct in place, bankers and their customers should be more certain about their legal relationship. Their commercial relationship, however, is far less clear especially as both retail banks and consumers have undergone significant changes in recent years. Emphasis in the banker-customer relationship, bank training and professional education, has typically focussed on "beginnings" (the initial lending decision) and "endings" (the effective use of security). Whilst these are undoubtedly important it is the "middle" (the quality of relationship) that must now be developed.
The emphasis on product based, transactional banking in the 1980's and early 90's had a marked effect on bank organisational structures and sources of income. Banks enjoyed the benefits of profitability and sales growth but suffered from a lack of customer loyalty 9 . Increased levels of competition and the advent of technology driven delivery channels have effectively compounded the problem by commoditising bank products and replacing inertia with a greater degree of customer empowerment.
Consequently, by the mid 1990's banks had begun to realise the importance of reintroducing "relationship management" and introducing customer retention policies.
Although attitudes and practices are often slow to change in large organisations banks are beginning to balance the "lifetime value" of customers with the move towards individual account profitability 10 . Banks also know that customer acquisition is more expensive than customer retention although few have applied this logic of this in dealing with bad debts, insolvency and defaulting customers 11 .
US research has indicated that the long term success of firms, in terms of sustainable competitive advantage, is associated with investment in relationships with customers and suppliers 12 (in banking, customers and suppliers are synonymous in certain circumstances since funds deposited in accounts are used by banks to fund lending).
Fine tuning of communications with customers also gives benefits. Specialised training and the focused deployment of staff can, therefore, help to engender the trust, satisfaction and commitment that banks desire in their relationships with customers 13 .
Insolvency Law and Practice
Since passage of the 1986 Insolvency Act insolvent UK personal debtors have had access to a statutory Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) procedure which is designed to avoid the finality and penalties of bankruptcy. The IVA between debtors and creditors was designed to allow viable sole traders to continue in business or to achieve a better and more orderly realisation of assets for the creditors. The legislative provisions followed the recommendations of a review committee 14 and extensive consultation 15 that noted the need to "rescue" debtors and to distinguish between the dishonest and the unlucky. Although the review committee also recommended a curtailed procedure for consumer debtors this was not carried through to the statute books and so the IVA "rescue" vehicle remains available to small unincorporated businesses and individual debtors alike.
The IVA is a private contract for the satisfaction of personal debts. As such it can be influenced by the quality of the relationships between lenders and debtors. In this court-supervised procedure the debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied, under the guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner (IP) and under the protection of a "moratorium" on creditor action. The creditors are given the opportunity of amending and accepting or rejecting the proposal 16 .
Whilst bankruptcy ends the banker -customer contract the IVA does not.
Consequently, creditor predisposition, influence and action have had an important place in the IVA procedure and the years since 1986 have seen a steady rise in the incidence and acceptance of IVAs 17 . There is also growing evidence of their successful application 18 . 
Economic considerations
The fact that banks, as lenders, should be able to pursue profitable lending opportunities is not in question. What is questioned, however, is the time-scale over which such profits are measured.
In the short-term it appears that banks have profited enormously from the unprecedented demand for unsecured consumer credit. Annual growth rates in credit card debt, for example, calculated as part of the money supply -M4, consistently exceeded RPI inflation by 2 to 3 percentage points between 1996 and 1998 21 . Over the same period bankruptcy and IVA numbers have grown (See Figure 1) and are now maintained at a higher level (total estimated at 28,000 for 1999) than at any time since the recession of the early 1990's. In 1998-99 total insolvency growth outstripped the growth in consumer credit with IVAs maintaining their "share" of cases. Petitions for bankruptcy also maintained high numbers, with around 65 -68% of all petitions being granted and debtors being made bankrupt between 1991 and 1998
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Where banks hold unsecured debt the tendency in corporate insolvency has been towards liquidation (bankruptcy) rather than rescue or rehabilitation. Smaller businesses appear not to warrant bank involvement in workouts 23 and the same policy appears to be adopted for unincorporated businesses and personal debtors. This approach is typically justified by banks on the basis that there is no point "putting good money after bad" (sic) 24 .
The financial argument for this is clear: the amount of debt written off (debt less recoveries) can influence specific provisions for bad and doubtful debt, net profits and tax charges. Transaction costs incurred in account intervention will merely add to losses in the short-term.
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The longer-term economic argument is less clear but sees write-offs as "sunk costs".
Normal costs of extending credit must take potential losses into consideration and be discounted in the risk related interest rate charged. The decision to invest in relationships with debtors should not, therefore, take the bad debt loss into account.
Instead, the decision should compare the risk weighted "lifetime value" of the debtor against the cost of a more detailed investment in customer rehabilitation.
In a congested and competitive market such a policy may be more commercially viable in the longer term, especially where both legislation and social values want to encourage "serial entrepreneurs" 25 and where large numbers of bankrupts are repaying nothing to their lenders. Taking a slightly different perspective, customer information relating to crisis and rehabilitation could eventually lead to danger signals being recognised much earlier in the day, allowing banks to take preventative action and, perhaps, even avoid the need for bankruptcy and IVAs.
The ethical dimension
In 1984 Cork 26 recognised that changes in commercial life and society since passage of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 necessitated a review and refashioning of insolvency law.
The 1986 reforms that Cork influenced recognised that there needed to be a balance between two separate views of bankruptcy: as a sanction against deviancy and consumer laxness (deterrence) and as a form of consumer protection 27 .
In a society based on credit, bankruptcy will still exclude individuals from the credit system and act as a punishment. It will also provide a "safety valve", recognising that credit providers share responsibility for over-commitment. The key task in achieving this balance is to distinguish between the dishonest insolvent and the merely unlucky.
The Creditors' maintenance of a bankruptcy "stigma" is under pressure from government 32 and society in general. A society based on credit generally has a greater acceptance of debt and a more permissive attitude to default 33 . The sheer numbers of individuals seeking the protection of bankruptcy also serves to diminish its threat of censure 34 .
Together, the perceived inefficiency in official bankruptcy administration and the automatic discharge from bankruptcy after three years appear a favourable alternative when compared with the five years for the average IVA 35 .
A more accessible feature of the equation, for UK creditors is the institutional credittrust relationship between lender and borrower. Initial lending relationships between banks and new customers are likely to be deterrence based but will develop into knowledge based relationships where personal contact and repeated interaction are prevalent 36 . Personal lending by UK banks is rarely relationship based, however and most "arms-length" consumer credit transactions will remain deterrence based.
When the value of the deterrence diminishes, however, as society's view changes and as bankruptcy law favours rehabilitation, the deterrent effect breaks down. In addition the deterrence-based relationship is unlikely to engender any emotional or moral input by the borrower.
Conclusions
This paper presents a dilemma for bankers. It is a common dilemma as short-term profits are often prioritised ahead of long-term gains. It also presents a range of options for the bank when customer default presages formal insolvency.
Traditionally "short termism", driven by the need to satisfy shareholders, has taken overwhelming precedence over the need to develop long term relationships with customers. Increases in the level of competition have, however, focused attention on the importance of customer retention and the active management of the bankercustomer relationship.
Consequently, banks that were traditionally transaction oriented, with an emphasis on standardisation and centralisation, in an endeavour to reduce costs, are emerging as relationship oriented organisations. The value and importance of relationship strategies in reducing moral hazard in the provision of credit to personal customers has been discussed. The paper also recognises the impact of moral hazard on the administration of insolvency law, which, since 1986 has embraced the concepts of rescue and survival.
Insolvency law has, in this respect, been ahead of the "thinking" within banks and, significantly, has reflected the changing ethical attitudes of society to debt. In beginning to emerge as relationship-oriented organisations, therefore, the banks are adopting the values of society and the legal system but still have a long way to go in taking full advantage of IVAs. In a competitive environment banks need to embrace the importance of business rescue and survival in order to benefit from customer retention and continuing relationships with their debtor customers.
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